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Generic approach is needed
for reforming natural monopolies
Privatisation and liberalisation are underway in those sectors of the Ukrainian
economy where natural monopolies exist. However, general vision and policy
principles regarding natural monopolies are yet to be developed. In order to
elaborate a general approach to reforming natural monopolies, and to define
sectoral priorities in this process. The International Centre for Policy Studies
held an expert discussion titled “Policy for reforming natural monopolies in
Ukraine”. The discussion also intended to facilitate the development of a special
chapter for ICPS’s journal Quarterly Predictions
What is natural monopoly?
In certain sectors of the economy, only a
sole company can be an efficient producer
of goods or services. If average costs
increase when competitors enter the
market, the sector is a natural monopoly.
The following services are currently
designated as natural monopolies in
Ukraine: gas and electricity transportation,
local telephony, rail road, heat and water
supply. Diminishing average costs is the
common feature of these industries: high
initial costs to ensure service provision (for
example, installing power or phone lines)
are followed by fixed, or even diminishing,
costs needed to serve every additional
consumer. The existence of natural
monopoly companies in certain sectors is
desirable for society as they are more
efficient than competition.
The activity of natural monopolies is not
different from the behaviour of ordinary
monopolies and therefore inevitably leads
to losses for the public. Monopolists tend to
maximise their own profits, not public
wellbeing. As a result, there is a need to
regulate the activity of natural monopolies
in order to achieve a win'win situation—the
natural monopoly providing services with
minimal costs, while the society is able to
avoid losses which result from the
monopolistic behaviour of the producer.
How are natural monopolies
regulated?
Regulatory policy on natural monopolies has
the following objectives:
• ensure a net profit from regulation (costs
of regulation should not exceed the losses of
the natural monopoly);
• decrease public losses caused by distorted
pricing and resource distribution;
• guarantee smooth functioning of sectors
which are natural monopolies and ensure
that services are available;
• create incentives for innovative activities.
The government usually regulates the
rates which natural monopolies impose on
provided monopoly services, as well as the
access of consumers to such services.
International experience demonstrates
that an independent regulatory body
ensures the most efficient regulatory
activities in this sphere. The Law of
Ukraine “On natural monopolies” regulates
the creation of such bodies for natural
monopoly sectors.
Soviet legacy complicates
the situation
A special feature of natural monopolies in
Ukraine is that the majority of monopolies
are state enterprises which work both in
naturally monopolistic and potentially
competitive markets. For this reason, the
first step towards reforming natural
monopolies should be to restructure
enterprises with corporatisation and spin'
off of “non'monopolistic” sub'divisions.
“Non'monopolistic” markets should be
liberalised, while “non'monopolistic”
enterprises should be privatised.
Eventually, regulations should be
implemented (relevant laws and normative
acts should be adopted, an independent
regulatory body should be established), and
the issue regarding optimal ownership for
natural monopolies should be addressed.
Choosing the form
of ownership
The benefits of privatisation embody the
notion that a private company has all the
incentives for effective functioning and for
engaging in active innovative activities, give
a favourable regulatory environment.
However, the costs of regulation are high
(elaboration of pricing methodology,
development of standards, monitoring and
control, etc.).
The benefit of state ownership is that the
state enterprise is managed by the
principle of maximisation not of profits but
public wellbeing, and part of the monopoly
revenue is distributed in favour of
consumers. Among the drawbacks are
lower efficiency of state enterprises
comparatively to private companies where
business activities are determined by
different incentives. Furthermore, the
meaning of “public wellbeing” depends on
the current political situation. Unlike the
managers of private firms, directors of
state enterprises have lower incentives to
satisfy owner interests. Compared to
private firms, state enterprises are
managed less efficiently, since state
controllers have lower labour incentives.
Since clear control procedures are missing,
managers of state enterprises often tend
to abuse.
Concession is a third possible form of
ownership; in this case, the government
sells the right to manage the monopoly to
the private agent proposing the lowest price
for service delivery and satisfying certain
requirements (which should replace
regulation). The advantages of concession
are that the contract partially replaces
regulation (therefore, there is no need to
spend on a permanent regulatory body) and
that concessionaires use resources
efficiently. The substantial disadvantages of
concession agreements are that the price
Today, the Coordination and Analysis Centre,
in which one of co'founders is the
International Centre of Policy Studies,
unites several dozen associations, unions,
and federations of different missions. At
the CEC’s initiative, a Council of Ukrainian
Business Associations was created under
the State Committee for Economic
Development on 18 May 2000. The council
aims to involve business associations in
work on drafting laws related to
entrepreneurship, to ensure open decision'
making, and to provide feedback between
entrepreneurs and executive bodies.
According to Yuri Yekhanurov, First Deputy
Prime Minister of Ukraine, this consulting
and advising body “effectively influences
government officials and makes them hear
the voice of the public and take into
account its interests.”
Thanks to the consolidated efforts of the
Coordination and Analysis Centre, the Law of
Ukraine “On licensing certain economic
activities” was adopted. This legislation
provides a partial transition from the
permissive to the declarative principle of
licensing, facilitates the procedures for
obtaining licenses by entrepreneurs, and
establishes clear responsibilities for
breaching legislation on licensing. CEC
experts are continuing to work on licensing
by'laws.
As a result of another campaign initiated by
the Coordination and Analysis Centre, the
law “On using electronic cash registers and
sales books in transactions with customers
in trade, catering, and the services sector”
was amended; under the non'amended law,
it was practically impossible to run a
business legally for those choosing the
simplified taxation system. Initially, as a
result of pressure on the part of business
associations, the term for the law coming
into force was postponed, then the law
amendments were lobbied.
CEC’s experts also actively participated in
drafting a Special Chapter and Chapter 13,
“General administrative provisions”, of the
Tax Code, and the laws “On microloans
originated by special organisations for small
enterprises”, “On standardisation”, “On
confirming compliance”, and “On accrediting
bodies for compliance evaluation”.
At the meeting, membership was granted to
14 more business associations. In addition,
the Kherson Regional Representative Office
of Coordination and Analysis Centre was
inaugurated. CEC already has its branch
offices in Lviv, Ternopil, Kharkiv,
Dniprodzerzhynsk, and Odesa.
Facing the need to be institutionalised, the
analytical group of the Coordination and
Analysis Centre established the Institute of
Competitive Society in June 2000. At the
meeting, the CEC Council delegated the
functions of the analytical group to this
institute.
Members of the Coordination and Analytical
Centre also decided on major CEC activities
in 2001. In particular, priority activities
include taxation policy and improvement of
draft Tax Code, small business development,
simplification of regulations on
entrepreneurial activities, development of
competition and of a social safety network,
and creation of legislation on non'
government organisations. In addition, CEC
experts plan to develop proposals regarding
the coordination between accounting and
tax reporting. !
for services depends on the level of
competition at the stage of the concession
tender, and weak control which can affect
the quality of services.
During the abovementioned discussion,
ICPS’s experts evaluated the three
described options while taking into account
the realities of the transitional period in
Ukraine. State ownership does not
necessarily follow corporate management
procedures which comply with the demand
of a market economy. However, this option
can be optimal when privatisation is
associated with high risks. The risks of
natural monopoly privatisation in Ukraine
include unclear mechanisms for contract
enforcement and a weak judicial system.
Concession creates big opportunities for
corruption, since long'term contracts do not
have clear regulatory provisions.
In addition, the uninviting investment image
of Ukraine does not increase the number of
potential contestants to participate in
concession tenders.
Experts emphasise common
features and differences among
industries
The discussion demonstrated that despite
technological distinctions in different
industries, the problems of regulation for
natural monopolies are, in fact, common. In
any case, a common principle should be
followed: regulations should be developed
prior to privatisation. Another common
feature for all industries is the need to
develop clear mechanisms for price
regulation which are based on proven theory.
Meanwhile, such aspects as restructuring of
enterprises which belong to natural
monopolies and choosing an optimal form of
ownership for them differ from industry to
industry. For instance, the gas transportation
system has a monopoly importer for its
services—the Russian joint'stock company
Gazprom—and technological features which
limit the possibilities to split it among several
enterprises. In terms of ownership,
privatisation is risky, because for political
reasons it will be difficult to follow
regulations if Gazprom wins the tender. On
the other hand, state ownership would result
in permanent pressure to gas transporting
enterprises on the part of government bodies
whose actions are influenced by politics.
The discussion also revealed that the
ongoing process of reform in different
natural monopoly industries is inconsistent.
Whereas issues regarding the determination
of optimal powers of an independent
regulatory body have been already raised for
the communication and electricity sectors,
Ukrzaliznytsia (railway monopoly enterprise)
has not even approached the stage of
corporatisation and remains under the
relevant ministry. These facts show the
urgent need to determine the priorities for
reforming natural monopolies in Ukraine.!
The expert discussion “Policy for reforming
natural monopolies in Ukraine” took place at
the International Centre for Policy Studies on
18 January 2001.
Participation of entrepreneurs
in policymaking yields results
On 15 January, a meeting of the Council of the Coordination and Analysis Centre
for Ukrainian Business Associations (CEC) took place in order to summarise the
results of the CEC’s activities in 2000 and to discuss plans for the nearest period
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